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Abstract - Despite efforts of several authors, surveillance 
is nowadays yet sparsely understood, although 
surveillance has increasing impacts in our lives. The 
purpose of this paper is to point out, from a theoretical 
point of view, the threats that surveillance presents to 
political participation (and by consequence, to 
democracy) in digital societies. Current researches 
present the threats of surveillance to democracy focusing 
mainly in democracy-privacy trade-offs. Such debate, on 
the one hand, circumscribes the issue to a great extent to 
choosing the rulers and the kind of political regime, 
which does not allow a broader analysis of citizen 
participation in all spheres of public life in their daily 
life. On the other hand, the current debates seem put a 
little aside from the main issue: it is not the loss of 
privacy, but the loss of autonomy that challenges 
participation (and by consequence, democracy); 
although nowadays the threats to autonomy proceed 
mainly from the loss of privacy.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Digital societies are those that bet on a knowledge-based 
development, through triggering processes that enables 
permanent creation, updating, diffusion, transference and 
sharing of knowledge. On that account knowledge societies 
are a better concept. On the other hand, concerning the 
predominant political and ideological conceptions, the 
knowledge-based development can also be inclusive, 
sustainable and participative. One chooses also by a more 
all-encompassing conception of digital city that are linking 
to all aspects of social, economic, political and cultural life. 
Another crucial theoretical proposition is that ICT don’t 
determine the digital cities’ emergency and development per 
se; they are only a device to achieve this goal. 
Simões [1][2][3] pointed out the social, political and 
cultural conditions, not only technological ones, that 
stimulate the participation through the use of ICT but also 
those which constrain that participation. This paper is the 
background to the challenge we are facing today and to 
which we intend to answer: what are the challenges that 
participation is dealing within digital societies considering 
the spreading and deepening of ICT and other technologies 
as surveillance devices?  
Although current studies on surveillance, namely those 
by Lyon and Marx, present the threats of surveillance to 
democracy focusing mainly in democracy-privacy trade-
offs, our proposal is quite different. On the one hand, we 
focus the debate on a more transversal issue: the political 
participation. Held’s concept of politics was adopted [4]; 
according the author, politics is power; it’s the capacity of 
individual and collective social actors to change or to 
maintain their social and physical environment. Politics 
concerns areas that demand appropriate public actions and 
choices from which one expects public consequences. 
On the other hand, the analysis of the threats to political 
participation (and thus to democracy) is centred on 
autonomy and not on privacy, as in current researches.  
Firstly, this paper presents crucial requirements for 
political participation. Secondly, the major theoretical 
propositions on surveillance are emphasised and the next 
point deals with the factors contributing and stimulating 
surveillance in digital societies. Before the final 
considerations, the paper looks upon surveillance risks to 
political participation. Finally, some considerations will be 
presented. 
   
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Marshall [5] identifies three kinds of citizenship – civil, 
political e social – that, in his evolutionist perspective, have 
emerged in a sequential way in the 18
th
, 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries. The first established the necessary rights for the 
exercise of individual freedom (namely personal freedom, 
freedom of thought, speech and religion, the right to justice, 
to private property and to establish contracts. Political 
citizenship acclaims the right to vote and of association and 
the right to participate in politics, whether as a voter or an 
elected member (thus with political authority). 
This gradual evolution of citizenship should conclude at 
the welfare state in the mid-20th century, through the 
attribution of social rights that have established social and 
economic security rights, i.e., education, health, 
employment, social security rights, among others. 
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Marshall [6] had already made a clear distinction 
between formal rights and their effective application, 
defending that the effective exercise of citizenship was only 
possible since where the social rights were also assured. 
Without social rights, i.e., a certain level of well-being, 
people would not have material grounds to participate as 
equals in the political and social life, because they would 
live economically and politically subordinated to others. In 
this sense, the impact of the formal equality of civil and 
political rights was scarce. 
Theories of political participation, notwithstanding 
voluntarist action theories, start with a crucial assumption: 
an unequal distribution of economic, social and political 
resources limits the possibility of autonomous choices, 
judgement and political actions.  
To Simões [7], the most important issue is not if people 
act, but how they act, which became crucial to restate, on 
the one hand, the effectiveness of civil, political and social 
rights, and enunciate, in the other hand, the concept of 
autonomy and the conditions to autonomy effectiveness.  
How Roche [8] referred the citizens are autonomous 
when they are rational agents and free moral individuals. 
Autonomy «connotes the capacity of human beings to 
reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective and to be self-
determining. It involves the ability to deliberate, judge, 
choose and act upon different possible courses of action in 
private as well as public life» [9]. Its effectiveness is closely 
dependent on material and cognitive resources, among 
others, that people are able to achieve, and on facilities that 
allow (or prevent) access to these resources. It also depends 
on the liberation of constraints concerning relationships of 
economic, political and social domination. 
To Oldfield [10], actions are autonomous when they 
show characteristics as self-determination and authenticity. 
An action is self-determined when it is a product of a 
person’s will. This requires the skills of not being 
constrained by others or by the demands of institutions 
where one is included. It is authentic when it is built and 
chosen by each person, not by others, and rationally 
presented.  
The main issue about expanding surveillance is whether 
autonomy is being threatened, therefore endangering the 
political participation within digital societies. The debate 
around the autonomy concept is more heuristic to a further 
research than the privacy one.  As most people when facing 
the claim around privacy-security trade-offs, rapidly choose 
security, saying they have nothing to hide. But are they 
aware of the consequences brought to their autonomy by 
losing privacy? Are they aware of the loss on their faculty 
and power to make political choices and to participate in 
decision-making within the public domain? Thus, when we 
face threats to political participation, the central issue is the 
autonomy. 
Certainly, the autonomy is mostly threatened nowadays 
by the invasion of privacy enabled by ICT and other 
technologies used as surveillance devices. In this sense, it is 
crucial to analyse how autonomy intertwine with privacy 
(invasion) and also to deepen the research about privacy in 
the digital era, as this era has some specificities and it is also 
a very open-ended theoretical domain, where there are 
already many contributions to the research, namely of 
Nissenbaum [11] and Stalder [12]. The first author gives 
crucial contributions for this matter when she presents a 
theoretical account of the right to privacy as it is applied to 
information on people and she proposes an analysis of 
privacy in terms of contextual integrity, differentiating 
norms of appropriateness and norms of distribution. The 
second author when emphasises that the theory of privacy – 
based on concepts of separation and individualism – is 
unworkable in an environment characterized by a myriad of 
electronic connections. 
III. SURVEILLANCE, AMBIVALANCE AND SOCIAL 
INTERESTS 
Surveillance is not a new phenomenon, but it increased 
exponentially in the end of the 20th century, largely because 
until then it was predominantly restricted to administrative, 
productive and military spheres. After that period, 
surveillance broadened extensively to all spheres and fields 
of social activity (commercial, health, public spaces, and so 
on), and it is also becoming global, intensively entering the 
routines of our private and daily lives. 
Surveillance has two faces, how Lyon [13] [14] referred 
to; surveillance is both enabler and constrainer to our action. 
A good example of this ambivalent process is how 
surveillance spread alongside the development of 
democracy and the emergency of social rights.  
It’s wrong that we focus only on one surveillance face. 
Its positive and/or negative dimensions can be tightened 
more in one direction than another, depending on what 
interests and purposes surveillance devices are designed, 
created and used for. We should also look upon the 
historical context in which those are inserted because the 
effects of technological systems aren’t the same in all 
contexts in which they are used. On the other hand, knowing 
people’s and organizations’ ideologies in each context helps 
to understand the goals for which surveillance devices are 
aimed and how they are used; it also helps to identify 
specific resistance forms that allow to change or reducing 
the more negative effects of surveillance. 
As Lyon [15] pointed, the systematic surveillance 
actually developed along the cities, corporations, 
governmental administration and military organization 
growth, all in all with modernity, particularly increasing 
since the 19th century. The reinforcement and spreading of 
surveillance practices can not be understood, like in Marxist 
approaches, as a product of a capitalist conspiracy [16]. 
They result from the complex way we organize our society, 
our social, political and economic relations. We live in 
societies that value consumption freedom, speed, mobility, 
efficacy, productivity, efficiency and security. In this sense, 
in modern societies, most organizations use ST in 
systematic ways, in order to reduce uncertainties and to 
control production outcome but mostly to prevent risks in 
security grounds as opposing to threatening behaviours and 
obtaining people agreement. 
The surveillance technologies (ST) used for risk 
prevention were intensified after September 11th, 2001. The 
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belief in diminishing potential risks and controlling 
outcomes through technology enhances the pressure to 
move towards more and more sophisticated surveillance 
means. More and more specialized agencies are increasingly 
using more and more sophisticated means to collect 
people’s data in a customary way, make all of them target 
groups of monitorization and suspicion. 
The way how ST are designed and programmed as the 
intended data outcome aren’t neutral. As Lyon [17] 
highlights, ST intended effects aiming to reinforce regimes 
that they were designed and programmed for. These effects 
have only recently began to be analysed in a systematic way 
and are yet barely understood. 
Surveillance was always a source of power and today 
even more. But it would be simplistic to think that ST 
reinforce the position of the most powerful, as according to 
the structuralist perspective of Foucault, read in the 
panopticon metaphor, where individuals act passively in 
accordance to the established rules, their behaviours being 
determined by settled surveillance systems. It would also be 
simplistic to think, according to the voluntarist theories of 
action, that surveillance implies no constraints to individual 
action, as people are able to choose their actions freely. 
Burns and Flam [18], in the field of synthesis theories, 
reject both perspectives, as humans, despite the rigidity of 
social structures, are cognitive beings and endowed with 
opportunities to resist, reduce, change and reshape the 
constraints imposed by dominant groups.  As Giddens [19] 
says, in the field of dialectic control, power is not always 
absolute. 
Technologies are both socially shaped and with social 
consequences; some of them can overhaul the purposes for 
which they were created. Besides, even if they were created 
and used with good purposes, they might have undesirable 
and unintended consequences. 
IV. FACTORS THAT STIMULATE AND CONTRIBUTE TO 
SURVEILLANCE 
Surveillance is thus today the result of a process that has 
been spreading and being refined throughout history. An 
important milestone was the 19
th
 century, as the 
development of statistics was used by the states to count, 
categorize, classify and administer their citizens. Its 
emergency already set the framework and models to how 
surveillance should develop in the next centuries.  
With the introduction of statistics, Castel [20] 
emphasises a change from the “observable” to the 
“deduced” in the construction of individual selves. The 
administrative practices were thus focusing more on risks 
than on dangers. The gathering of data, which focused only 
on specific suspected groups or individuals to thwart danger, 
widened to monitor everyone to prevent risk. Risk 
management is associated to the use of statistic techniques. 
These techniques were set to create personal profiles that 
weren’t under the immediate glance of those who watch. 
Preventive policies are no longer interested in individuals; 
with statistic techniques, profiles are built starting with the 
subject deconstruction followed by a construction based on 
a combination of statistical correlations of heterogeneous 
elements and facts that allow verifying if individuals are 
susceptible or not of producing risk. 
When paper surveillance was replaced by electronics, it 
gained «the potential to erode liberties and freedoms 
because those technologies changed the balance of power in 
our society» [21]. In the late 1980’s, before the increasing 
sophistication of ICT and the emergency of others ST, Gary 
Marx [22] highlighted that computers had not only spread 
the surveillance scope but also allowed more regular and 
deepened forms of surveillance, emphasizing also that the 
way ST are to be used in contemporary societies reaffirms 
an increasing totalitarian potential, regardless who controls 
these surveillance means. 
Commercial surveillance is one of the major contributors 
to the erosion of the boundaries between public and private 
spaces and to the intensification of surveillance that begins 
to embrace the routines of our daily life and our privacy 
[23]. Let us just consider credit cards, data from insurance 
companies or frequent costumer cards provided by all kinds 
of shops, including bookshops and cinemas.  
Certainly, commercial surveillance devices are aimed to 
persuade people as consumers, but they can hold other 
purposes, i.e., political, as it happened with other 
technological devices. These cards allow knowing where, 
when and what we consume, thus revealing our political and 
ideological preferences: precious information to detect 
political activists in some democratic countries and even 
more in (potential) authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. 
The spreading of CCTV «over city-centre streets 
represents the most visible sign of the “dispersal of 
discipline” from the prison to the factory and school, to 
encompass all the urban landscape» [24]. 
About liberty-security trade-offs, after the terrorist 
attacks in the London underground, people of UK feel safer 
with the CCTV, but in this ambivalent social world, these 
devices created for safety reasons can stretch its action to 
the political sphere, recording encounters and gatherings 
that participating people didn’t want to be watched and 
recorded. 
If surveillance spread in fixed places, the same happened 
in online and offline mobilities area [25]. If credit cards and 
mobile phones allow detecting where people are or were, on 
the other hand, GPS (Global Positioning Satellite) allow 
locating and monitoring drivers and mobile phone users; 
other localization devices as intelligent transportation 
systems, are referred by Bennet, Raab and Regan [26], 
namely the automatic systems of highway tolls and 
embedded chips in vehicles. 
All these devices allow tracing where we are, where we 
were, where we are going or where we went and clearly 
with whom we talk or meet. On the other hand, online 
mobility also allows recording not only what we search, 
what we read, with whom we speak and what is said, which 
is invasive concerning civil and political rights. 
Biosurveillance, research domain namely of Ploeg [27] 
and Nelkin [28], is another growing field of surveillance 
through the collection of DNA, eyes, face, hands, fingers, 
voice and body data. The possibility to link each name and 
each number to a body allows distinguishing people 
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therefore “enriching” citizen categorization, classification 
and profiling in order to reinforce social control.  
Such processes cause not only inequalities accessing 
social and other rights thus reducing necessary resources to 
political participation, but such data can also be used more 
directly to achieve political goals, namely to identify people 
who were in specific places involved in political activities. 
The implementation of ID cards has increased from 
September, 11th on, particularly the most recent cards, 
which became the most important and the most 
sophisticated one from a technological point of view to 
perform social classification and control [29]. These 
devices, as those authors refer, combine, on one hand, 
traditional characteristics (namely data from the health 
system or social security databases) with more advanced 
characteristics of identification as biometric data. On the 
other hand, in ID cards we can find programmable chips to 
collect more data and that can be easily linked to remote 
authentication mechanisms [30]. 
However, ICT remained central because they alone have 
turned possible the collection of personal data and the 
construction of widened databases that allow the 
categorization and the upcoming classification of 
individuals for purposes of social control. 
We face a set of circumstances in which interest groups 
stimulate the development and deepen of technologies; these 
technologies strengthen the extensive and intensive 
advances of surveillance and also permit their spreading to 
unforeseen areas when they are to be conceived and 
designed.  
Marx [31], among other authors, pointed out that the 
control practice and culture is changing. According to him, 
“hard” forms of control aren’t reducing simultaneously as 
“soft” forms are expanding in different ways. Although, his 
“soft” designation doesn’t seem the more adequate term, 
because although some of them are less visible they are 
more invasive and challenge even more our citizenship 
rights. As the author refers we deal with data collection 
processes that encompass the use of misleading information, 
with benefits offered in return of information, with 
gathering of “false” volunteers appealed to good citizenship 
and even with the use of hidden or disguised collection 
techniques. 
V. SURVEILLANCE, RISK AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
The major part of surveillance nowadays takes place 
within the digital sphere, thus we don’t see it and many 
times we don’t perceive it in our daily life. Moreover too 
much information about citizens flow more and more 
without their knowledge and permission. On the other hand, 
in most of the situations digital surveillance doesn’t work 
clandestinely, but in those regular moments and places of 
our daily life.  
This is even more worrying, because large population 
sectors are more willing to give away their personal data, 
believing more in the benefits of surveillance than in its 
potential risks, thinking they have nothing to fear or hide 
[32]. 
Governments, companies or the media contribute to this 
situation because news focuses on the impressiveness of 
robbery, crime, war and terrorism facts. This contributes to 
increasing feelings of insecurity on people, making them to 
accept the surveillance devices. 
We can yet look at cultural changes characterized by the 
fascination of exposing aspects of private lives and public 
exposition, namely on facebook and TV, which implies that 
people cooperate with surveillance means [33]. Such 
assumptions allow rejecting the simplistic view that the 
available data only serve the interest groups that have the 
technological devices to collect data. 
Moreover, the ICT made possible erasing data, either 
without trace, or traceable only by experts, which raises 
crucial issues concerning data reliability [34].  
Both of these aspects have great implications in the 
political sphere.  
As Marx [35] emphasizes, we are interested as citizens 
in avoiding discrimination, manipulation and an 
inappropriate classification that could be the result of an 
inadequate combination of our personal data.  
This inappropriate classification can even be obtained 
for political ends, namely inducing certain political 
behaviour. 
As it has already referred, the problematic issue is that 
citizens profile are constructed connecting decontextualized 
data which don’t translate the variety of personal and social 
contexts, as these are reduced to limited number of 
variables: the necessary for prevision and scientific 
generalization capacities. Given that any data can be 
classified regarding a statistic model as comprising higher 
or lower risk, it was assumed that risk is understood and 
consequently controllable in a probabilistic ground. In this 
process identities are constructed with decontextualized data 
and subsequently not equal to our own identities. For 
example, we can be considered political activists or 
oppositionists when fact we are not. The worst is that these 
identities were never questioned and, despite this fact, they 
can prescribe our political behaviour. 
As Marx [36] says, it can work for management and 
medical decision-making, but not for liberties and 
democratic rights; many times people know little about 
these databases and their consequences and how their 
identities are thus constructed. 
The registration, categorization and classification made 
possible by ST trigger processes of inclusion and exclusion 
concerning participation opportunities that have impact 
upon people’s life trajectories, depending on the categories 
in which they are inserted, even though these categories do 
not match up to our own identities. In short, surveillance 
impacts on political participation, on our life opportunities, 
on our privacy and also on social control and democracy.  
So, we are facing nowadays a paradoxical situation: the 
use of ST for preventing risk has increasingly become a risk 
[37]. A risk to be taken into account for the exercise of 
citizenship; where we face also the threat of totalitarianism. 
The question is whether we are witnessing either an increase 
in their negative dimensions or a growing imbalance of 
power between the "vigilant" and the "monitored" and thus, 
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a subsequent thickening of the raising risks of a totalitarian 
and/or unequal society, composed by increasingly 
“transparent” citizens. 
VI  FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
With the enlargement of the surveillance scope and its 
increasing intensity, if we render ourselves into more 
“transparent” citizens and because it is impossible to know 
whether we are being monitored or not, like in Foucault’s 
panopticon, ST have the capacity to induce a state of 
permanent and conscious visibility, as felt by the panopticon 
prisoner, that assures the automatic functioning of power, 
which can threaten our autonomy, constrain our political 
activity or determine political participation according to the 
status quo. 
The increasing and deepening surveillance referred 
above occur most of the times with none or insufficient 
public debate about established policies, but also with such 
haste that legal and political efforts that could safeguard 
certain social and political implications are limited.  
As Lyon [38] and other authors say, can we be facing 
the emergency of a more totalitarian society, a prison 
society?  
Yes, we do, but before going down that road, it is 
essential to centre the debate on two previous issues. Firstly, 
we need to focus the debate on a more transversal issue: 
political participation. Secondly, we need to centre the 
research primarily on the challenges to autonomy instead of 
those regarding privacy. It is the reduction of autonomy that 
can contribute to the conditioning of even more public 
actions as well as choices of the citizens (namely in the 
spheres of education, work and health), but can also lead to 
a totalitarian society. So, it is important to put the following 
question: do “transparent” citizens have autonomy to 
participate in the political life of their cities, regions, 
countries or even at a global level? 
Political participation depends primarily on autonomy. 
Certainly, the invasion of privacy is nowadays the major 
process of reducing autonomy, adjoining to other forms of 
domination, as economic domination. Thus, the ways how 
privacy intertwines with autonomy are crucial issues.  
The concept of autonomy has also a more heuristic 
potential for research on the perceptions of people about 
how surveillance threats political participation. This can be 
a first step to a public debate.   
On the other hand, by centring the debate on autonomy it 
becomes easier to mobilize citizens to participate in the 
public debate concerning expanding surveillance and the 
threats to their political participation. As we saw in other 
section, when citizens are facing the security-privacy trade-
offs, they choose security, saying that they have nothing to 
hide. But are they aware of the consequences that the loss of 
their privacy brings upon their autonomy (and thus in their 
political participation)? Then, the research and the public 
debate have to focus on the issue of autonomy.  
The public debate will be one of the paths to face the 
imbalance of power between the "vigilant" and the 
"monitored". Through ICT, citizens can trace many 
platforms not only to debate but also to mobilize other 
citizens who aren’t aware of surveillance threats. The public 
debate can lead to another design, other programming of ST 
and even to someone’s refusal. More than that, citizens have 
to participate in decision making processes regarding the 
design and use of surveillance devices in order to assure our 
freedom and democracy, which are only possible with our 
autonomous participation.  
Sociological research is also crucial to our self-
knowledge of social reality and a path to achieve more 
responsive surveillance practices, that is, practices that 
didn’t threatened the political citizenship.  
From a theoretical point of view, it would be crucial to 
deepen even more the links between autonomy and privacy 
in digital societies. In future works we will consider these 
issues. 
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